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Quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory (at least so far
as the empirical predictions are concerned). It follows that, if one wants to
properly understand quantum mechanics, it is essential to clearly understand
the meaning of probability statements. The interpretation of probability has
excited nearly as much philosophical controversy as the interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics. 20th century physicists have mostly adopted a frequentist
conception. In this paper it is argued that we ought, instead, to adopt a logi-
cal or Bayesian conception. The paper includes a comparison of the orthodox
and Bayesian theories of statistical inference. It concludes with a few remarks
concerning the implications for the concept of physical reality.
11. Introduction
This paper is about probability. It was originally stimulated by some conver-
sations with Chris Fuchs [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] concerning the foundations of quantum
mechanics. These conversations had a major impact on my thinking: they made
me wonder if there might, after all, be something to be said for the Copenhagen
interpretation.
I did at first doubt whether it is appropriate to dedicate these remarks to the
memory of Jim Cushing, who expended much energy on the task of challenging the
Copenhagen hegemony [6]. But after reflection I decided that it is very appropriate.
Jim has spent a great deal of time and effort studying Copenhagen ideas: far more
than I have myself. I feel that he would have to be interested at least in the question.
What he would think of my (tentative) answer is, unfortunately, impossible now
to know. But what I do know is that there is no one whose opinion I would more
eagerly have sought.
Jim was, before he was anything else, a friend of reason. He had no objection
to someone who adopts Copenhagen assumptions provisionally, in a spirit of free
enquiry, to see where they lead. His objection was to dogmatic Copenhagenism:
the insistence that Bohr and his colleagues settled the question, completely, once
and for all, and that there is nothing more of any interest to be said on the subject.
Nowadays this attitude would be quite unusual. Even those who are sympathetic
to Copenhagen ideas would mostly agree that there are many remaining obscurities.
There are, besides, numerous other interpretations on offer, all well represented in
the pages of the leading journals. However, it was not always so. The climate which
existed 30 years ago is well illustrated by the editorial comment [7] in which the
editor of Reviews of Modern Physics defends his decision to publish Ballentine [8].
It can be seen from this comment that there was then a substantial body of opinion
which held that Einstein’s ideas regarding the interpretation of quantum mechanics
should not be discussed in the scientific literature. It is this refusal even to consider
the question which Bell [9] (p. 160) aptly describes as Copenhagen “complacency”.
Fortunately those days are now over. We seem to have finally got back to the
situation which existed in the 1920’s, where the Copenhagen case has to be argued.
We owe this happy state of affairs to the efforts of Jim Cushing and others who
have struggled to convince the physics community that Bohr’s word should not be
taken as final. I think that even those who favour the Copenhagen approach owe
him a debt. An atmosphere of bland orthodoxy, in which stimulating discussion is
not to be had, is unlikely to foster new ideas.
Fuchs [4] (p. 173) advocates the Copenhagen interpretation in the following
terms:
“I have this ‘madly optimistic’ (Mermin called it) feeling that Bohrian-
Paulian ideas will lead us to the next stage of physics. That is, that
thinking about quantum foundations from their point of view will
be the beginning of a new path, not the end of an old one.”
Proposed like that, not as a piece of dogmatism, but as an invitation to serious
thought, the Copenhagen interpretation, to my mind, suddenly becomes interesting.
This does not mean that I find the Copenhagen interpretation satisfactory, as
it stands now. Bell [9] (pp. 173–4) argues that the Copenhagen interpretation is
“unprofessionally vague and ambiguous”. I think he is right. I also think he is right
to complain that quantum mechanics, when interpreted in traditional Copenhagen
terms, seems to be “exclusively concerned with ‘results of measurement’ and [seems
to have] nothing to say about anything else”. I share Bell’s conviction that the
aim of physics is to understand nature, and that counting detector “clicks” is not
2intrinsically any more interesting than counting beans. If prediction and control
were my aim in life I would have become an engineer, not a physicist.
Fuchs has not caused me to see clarity where I formerly saw obscurity, or realism
where I formerly saw positivism. What he has done is to make me wonder if it might
be possible to constuct a greatly improved version of the Copenhagen interpretation,
to which these objections would not apply. If I am asked to accept Bohr as the
authoritative voice of final truth, then I cannot assent. But if his writings are
approached in a more flexible spirit, as a source of insights which are not the less
seminal for being obscure, they suggest some interesting questions. I do not know
if this line of thought will be fruitful. But I feel it is worth pursuing. I also feel
that Jim Cushing would consider it worth pursuing.
I will make a few comments concerning the question of realism in Sections 4
and 12. However in this paper I will mainly be concerned with probability. Fuchs
and his co-workers have made a number of significant conceptual innovations (they
are, I believe, the first members of the Copenhagen tendency since the 1930’s who,
not content merely to reiterate pieces of received orthodoxy, seriously try to advance
the theory at a basic conceptual level). One such innovation is their analysis of
probability, and its relevance to the interpretation of quantum mechanics (also see
important work by Hardy [10, 11], Pitowsky [12] and Perey [13]).
Quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory. Of course, proba-
bility theory plays an essential role in classical physics too. However, in classical
physics the uncertainties can, in principle, be made arbitrarily small. In quantum
physics they are ineluctable1. So it is not unreasonable to suggest that, to properly
understand quantum mechanics, we need first to straighten out our ideas regarding
probability, and its physical significance.
Whereas the interpretation of quantum mechanics has only been puzzling us
for ∼ 75 years, the interpretation of probability has been doing so for more than
300 years [16, 17]. Poincare´ [18] (p. 186) described probability as “an obscure
instinct”. In the century that has elapsed since then philosophers have worked
hard to lessen the obscurity. However, the result has not been to arrive at any
consensus. Instead, we have a number of competing schools (for an overview see
Gillies [19], von Plato [20], Sklar [21, 22] and Guttman [23]).
The majority of 20th century physicists subscribed to a frequency interpretation
of probability. But in the 19th century a very different view was widely held. It is
exemplified by the following remark of Maxwell’s:
They say that Understanding ought to work by the rules of right
reason. These rules are, or ought to be, contained in Logic; but
the actual science of logic is conversant at present only with things
either certain, impossible, or entirely doubtful, none of which (for-
tunately) we have to reason on. Therefore the true logic for this
world is the calculus of Probabilities, which takes account of the
magnitude of the probability which is, or ought to be, in a reason-
able man’s mind. [J. Clerk Maxwell, quoted Jeffreys [24], p.1]
Maxwell here espouses what I am going to call an epistemic view of probability. As
Maxwell sees it a probability statement has a normative, or logical significance. It
does not directly assert a fact about the way things are in the world. Instead it
regulates our expectations concerning the world. Under the influence of Bayes and
Laplace [25] this way of looking at probability was common for a large part of the
19th century.
1Or so it now seems. This statement might need to be modified if Valentini’s [14, 15] ideas
were empirically confirmed.
3Suppose that Maxwell’s demon is interested in the question, whether a (classical)
molecule is going to hit its shutter during the interval (t, t+∆t) at some specified
time t in the future. Suppose that to begin with the demon only knows the temper-
ature, pressure and volume of the gas. On that basis the demon calculates that the
probability = (say) 0.001. Suppose, however, that the demon then acquires detailed
information regarding the positions and velocities of all the gas molecules at some
time < t; and suppose that on the basis of that new information, and Newtonian
mechanics, it calculates that a molecule is certain to arrive at its shutter during the
interval (t, t + ∆t). Then the probability changes discontinuously from 0.001 to 1
(the probability distribution might be said to “collapse”). But this discontinuous
change in the probability does not reflect any change in the state of the gas. All
that has changed is the state of the demon’s knowledge. That is what is meant by
calling the probability epistemic.
However, towards the end of Maxwell’s life the epistemic view began to go out
of fashion, and throughout the 20th century it was very unfashionable indeed2. In
physics it was largely replaced with the frequentist conception [37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42],
according to which a probability can be identified with a relative frequency in
some suitably defined ensemble. The attraction of this view is that, by removing
all reference to the knowledge and/or beliefs of some cognitive agent (human or
otherwise), it promises to make the concept of probability purely objective.
Fuchs et al consider that this was a mistake, and that we need to go back to an
epistemic conception. When I first became acquainted with their ideas I resisted
this suggestion . However, the more I have thought about it, the more I have become
convinced that they have to be right. This paper is the fruit of those cogitations.
Fuchs et al subscribe to the epistemic theory proposed by de Finetti [30, 31, 32,
33] (also see Ramsey [43]). I should say that I do not entirely agree with them
about that. Although I fully acknowledge the depth and importance of de Finetti’s
insights, it seems to me that he misses some essential points. My feeling is that
a completely satisfactory theoretical account has yet to be formulated. However,
that has no bearing on my argument here. In this paper I am simply concerned to
argue that the epistemic conception is, in one form or another, unavoidable.
Much of the paper concerns the theory of statistical inference, which has a cru-
cial bearing on the question. An essential part of the frequentist position is that
probabilities are, not only objective, but also in some sense observable. If the
proposal was instead that probabilities, though purely objective, are empirically
unknowable—if, in other words, probabilities were conceived as hidden variables—
then the frequentist idea would lose most, if not all, of its attractiveness.
The method of inference originally proposed by Bayes and Laplace is unsatisfac-
tory from the frequentist point of view because the inferred probability distribution
depends, not only on the empirical data, but also on a prior probabilistic assump-
tion. Suppose, for example, that a coin comes up heads on 500 out of 1000 suc-
cessive tosses. Then, with the appropriate choice of prior assumption, the inferred
distribution can be strongly concentrated in the vicinity of any probability in the
interval [0, 1]. This is not a problem if one looks at it from the epistemic point of
2I think that must be fair as a general statement. Nevertheless, the epistemic view has contin-
ued to engage the interest of a very active minority. 20th century advocates include Keynes [26],
Jeffreys [24, 27], Carnap [28], Lewis [29], de Finetti [30, 31], Savage [32], Bernardo and Smith [33],
Jaynes [34], Howson and Urbach [35] and Earman [36] (this list is not intended to be complete).
The list might be sub-divided into those [26, 24, 27, 28] who think that probability involves a new
kind of non-deductive logic and those [30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36] who take a Bayesian approach.
However, this classification is somewhat arbitrary. Jeffreys, in particular, straddles the two cate-
gories. Jaynes should be singled out for special mention because he is primarily concerned with
applications to physics.
4view which Maxwell describes in the passage I quoted above. However, from a fre-
quentist point of view it is a very serious problem. For the frequentist programme
to work a statistical inference needs to be something like a measurement: it must
be possible to read the inferred disribution directly off from the data, without the
assistance of any prior assumption.
In the opening decades of the 20th century Fisher [44], Neyman and Pearson [45]
and others accordingly developed a new statistical methodology, in conscious oppo-
sition to the ideas of Bayes and Laplace. This is the approach based on confidence
intervals and hypothesis tests which, for want of a better term3, I am going to call
the orthodox methodology. The attraction of the orthodox methodology is that,
unlike the Bayesian methodology, it seems to make statistics purely empirical, and
purely objective. One of the main conclusions of this paper is that it fails in that
purpose. Not only is it, as de Finetti [31] (vol. 2, p. 245) says, ad hoc. It is no less
dependent on prior probabilistic assumptions than the Bayesian methodology.
Hume [47] (p. 469) famously argued that one cannot validly infer an “ought” from
an “is”. A similar principle applies to probability statements: one cannot validly
infer a “probable” from an “is”. This principle is closely related to the conclusion
to Hume’s argument for inductive scepticism [47, 48]. It means that probability
judgments are not purely empirical. It also means that a probability statement
cannot be identified with a fact about the world, as it exists independently of us.
It was easy for Maxwell to accept an epistemic interpretation of probability
because he was thinking in terms of a world populated by classical atoms and
fields, whose objective reality was not in doubt. But if one translates the idea
to a quantum mechanical context, and suggests that the quantum state must be
interpreted epistemically, then the concept becomes very disturbing. It certainly
becomes disturbing to me (although I find Fuchs’s ideas stimulating, they also worry
me). On the face of it, taking an epistemic view of the state vector amounts to
giving up on the idea of physical reality altogether.
I remain very uncertain about this. An epistemic interpretation of the state
vector is, it seems to me, impossible to reconcile with Einsteinian realism: the
proposition that “the programmatic aim of all physics [is] the complete description
of any (individual) real situation (as it supposedly exists irrespective of any act of
observation or substantiation)” [49] (p. 667). However, I feel it may be consistent
with a much more subtle and interesting kind of realism, which is obscurely inti-
mated in the writings of Bohr, but which has yet to be properly articulated. I will
touch on this in Section 12.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 concern the frequency inter-
pretation. Section 4 concerns the idea of a propensity. Sections 5–8 are the core of
the paper and are concerned with the theory of statistical inference. Section 9 (also
Section 3) concerns the idea of impossibility FAPP (“for all practical purposes”).
Section 10 contains some final criticisms of the frequentist view, based on the argu-
ment in Sections 5–9. Section 11 concerns the epistemic view. Section 12 concerns
the question of physical realism.
2. Frequentism: Infinite Ensembles
Physicists naturally tend to favour a frequency interpretation of probability.
According to this conception the proposition “the probability of this coin coming
3I prefer not to use the term “frequentist methodology”. Although the question of inferential
methodology and the question of interpretation are intimately related, I think it is better to keep
them terminologically distinct. Jaynes [46] uses the term “orthodox statistics”. Since then use of
Bayesian techniques has become much more common. However, even if the description “orthodox
methodology” is no longer accurate, I feel it may still serve as a term of convenience.
5up heads = 1/2” is a straightforward factual assertion about the number of heads
in a long or infinite sequence of tosses. The idea is attractive because it promises
to give probability statements a purely objective significance. It is originally due
to Venn [37]. The best known 20th century proponents are von Mises [38, 39],
Reichenbach [40], Popper [41] (in the first part of his career) and van Fraassen [42].
Ha´jek [50] (endnote 2) says that among philosophers frequentism is now largely
confined to the “closet”. But he also remarks that it continues to pervade much
scientific thinking on the subject. It is not difficult to understand why. Once
acknowledge that frequentism is untenable, and one is forced to re-assess some of
the most basic assumptions of physical theory. Philosophers can afford to take
a comparatively relaxed attitude to this necessity. Physicists have more of an
investment.
If one wants to maintain that there is an effective4 logical equivalence between a
statement about the probability of a coin coming up heads, and a statement about
the actual frequency of heads in a sequence of tosses, then it is clearly essential that
the sequence be infinite. There is a problem with this, however: for it is (to say
the least) doubtful whether a coin physically could be tossed an infinite number of
times. Leaving aside the problems of corrosion, and mechanical wear, there is the
problem that we expect the sun eventually to become a red giant. Supposing the
coin to survive that vicissitude one then has the problem that the lifetime of the
proton, not to mention the universe, may be finite.
von Mises’s approach is to define the probability counter-factually, as the limiting
relative frequency which would be obtained if the coin were tossed an infinite
number of times (see, for example, von Mises [38], p.15). This might be acceptable
if the aim was only to provide a convenient way to think about probabilities (though
I would question whether it really is all that convenient). But, as Jeffrey [52] says,
it is clearly unacceptable if the aim is to identify a probability with an actually
existent physical quantity, out there in the world. If probabilities are to objectively
exist, then it is essential that the sequences in terms of which they are defined
should objectively exist.
The universe may have finite 4-volume. In that case, on an infinite frequentist
definition, there would not be any probabilities. At least, there would not be
any probabilities of directly observable events, having non-zero spatio-temporal
extension.
However, that is not the only difficulty with the infinite frequentist idea. Suppose
we grant, for the sake of argument, that the universe has infinite 4-volume. A theory
which makes the probabilities of events now, here in the Milky Way, critically
dependent on events more than 1010
100
years in the future, or more than 1010
100
light years distant, cannot be considered empirically relevant.
Let S be some suitably enormous, but still finite region of space-time containing
ourselves. Let E be the finite ensemble of 226Ra nuclei whose world-lines inter-
sect S, and let E∞ be the ensemble consisting of all
226Ra nuclei in the universe
(assumed infinite). Let f be the proportion of nuclei in E which decay in proper
time 1602 years, and let f∞ be the proportion in E∞ which do so (as defined by
some appropriate limiting procedure). Suppose it should happen that f = 1/2, but
f∞ = 1/10. Then, on an infinite frequentist definition, we are obliged to say that
the true decay-probability is 1/10. It would, however, seem more natural to say
4 The equivalence cannot be strict even in the case of infinite sequences. It is true that if the
probability of heads = 0.5 then, by the strong law of large numbers [51] (vol. 1, pp. 203–4), the
set of sequences in which the limiting relative frequency of heads either does not exist, or exists
but 6= 0.5, has measure zero (relative to the product measure on the space of infinite sequences).
But that is not equivalent to the proposition that such sequences are impossible.
6that the half-life of 226Ra is 1602 years in our part of the universe, but that it takes
different values elsewhere.
It is natural to ask if the parameters defining the standard model depend on
spatio-temporal position. If so one would expect half-lives typically to depend on
spatio-temporal position. But on an infinite frequentist definition that suggestion
is not even meaningful.
Suppose that a roulette wheel in London is spun 37, 000 times, and each number
comes up approximately 1, 000 times. Clearly, this has no implications for the
fairness of a different, completely unrelated roulette wheel in Rio de Janeiro. By
the same token, it has no implications for the fairness of the roulette wheel in
London in 1000 years time (supposing it still to exist).
Similarly, a determination of the half-life of 226Ra on the Earth now has, in itself,
without extra assumptions, no implications for what the half-life of 226Ra is at a
point 1010
100
light-years distant, or will be at a time 1010
100
years in the future.
Measuring the relative frequency in a finite ensemble in London in the year
2004ad does, in itself, without additional assumptions, tell one nothing about the
limiting relative frequency in some (purely hypothetical, empirically inaccessible)
embedding ensemble extending over an infinitely large spatio-temporal region. Sim-
ilarly, if per impossibile one knew the “true” probability in the sense of an infinite
frequentist definition, this would tell one nothing about the relative frequencies to
be expected in the finite ensembles of actual interest. This is, in essence, just the
point of Hume’s argument for inductive scepticism [47, 48].
Probabilities in the sense of an infinite frequentist definition may perhaps exist.
But they have nothing to do with the probabilities which we infer from our obser-
vations, and on which we base our practical decisions. They are empirically and
practically irrelevant.
Suppose we discovered that the universe does have finite 4-volume. This would
not affect practical probabilistic reasoning in any way. Tabulations of nuclear half-
lives would not suddenly be rendered meaningless.
3. Frequentism: Finite Ensembles
If one wants to give a frequentist definition of the probabilities which occur in
empirical reasoning, then the definition had better be in terms of finite ensembles.
The shift to finite ensembles necessitates a significant weakening of the frequen-
tist position. The proposition “the probability of heads = 0.5” is consistent5 with
any sequence of outcomes in a run of (say) 1000 tosses. It is admittedly very un-
likely that the coin will come up heads on each of 1000 tosses. But the probability
of this happening is > 0.
The usual response to this difficulty is to argue that very small probabilities count
as practical impossibilities. On those grounds it is suggested that the proposition
“the probability of heads = 0.5”, though not strictly equivalent, is for all practical
purposes equivalent to the proposition “the relative frequency of heads will be
extremely close to 0.5 in a sufficiently long sequence of independent tosses”.
In the philosophical literature an even weaker position is often advocated. Ac-
cording to Popper [41] (also see Gillies [19, 53] and, for a critical discussion, Howson
and Urbach [35]) the proposition “the probability of heads = 0.5” is not confirmed
by the outcome of any finite sequence of tosses. It is, however, practically falsified if
the sequence is sufficiently long, and if the relative frequency of heads is sufficiently
different from 0.5. Gillies [19] (p. 147) argues that this coincides with the principle
on which statistical hypothesis testing is based.
5As I remarked in footnote 4 it is logically consistent in the infinite case also. However, in the
infinite case there is zero probability of obtaining a limiting relative frequency 6= 0.5.
7There is a problem with this line of thought. Even a probability of 2−1000, though
it can be neglected for many practical purposes, cannot be neglected for all.
Suppose a coin comes up heads on each of 24 successive tosses. Then, if one
judges by the standards usual in statistical hypothesis testing, one will reject the
hypothesis that the coin is fair.
It is tempting to see this reasoning as a “for all practical purposes” or FAPP
version of an argument in formal logic. Suppose
P ∧Q⇒ R¯ (1)
(where R¯ signifies “not R”). Suppose it is known that P and R are both true.
Then it follows that Q is false.
The argument concerning the 24 coin tosses looks, superficially, like a “wobbly”
version of this, in which the logical rigours have been slightly relaxed. Let P =
“the coin is tossed 24 times, the tosses being independent”, Q = “the coin is fair”
and R = “24 heads obtained”. Then it is tempting to think
P ∧Q⇒ R˜ (2)
(where R˜ signifies “FAPP not R”). We know (or assume) that P and R are both
true. So we conclude that Q is false FAPP.
However, that badly misrepresents the real logic of the argument. Instead of 24
coin tosses consider a lottery with 224 tickets (this is about the number of tickets
in the British national lottery). Let P = “Alice buys one ticket”, Q = “the lottery
is fair” and R = “Alice wins”. Then, if one accepts the reasoning in the last
paragraph, one must apparently accept that here too
P ∧Q⇒ R˜. (3)
Suppose, now, that Alice does buy one ticket, and the ticket does win. Then, if
the reasoning in the last paragraph is valid, it would follow that here too Q is false
FAPP. However, that conclusion is clearly not justified. One cannot reasonably
infer that a lottery is unfair just on the grounds that somebody wins it.
The fallacy in this argument is the assumption leading to Eq. (3): that if R is
highly improbable, then R is effectively impossible. This assumption is justified
in some situations, but not in others. The problem is to decide exactly when it is
justified.
Let us note that the problem has nothing essentially to do with the exact size of
the probabilities. The argument based on Eq. (3) would still be invalid if Alice had
won a cosmic lottery having 10100 tickets. The microstate of the air in the room
where I am now writing is even more improbable: but it still happened.
In considering this question one needs to distinguish two different kinds of prob-
abilistic argument, which I will call predictive and retrodictive.
A predictive argument is one in which conclusions are drawn regarding an un-
known event (“predictive” because, although the event may be in the past, the
discovery as to whether it happened lies in the future). For instance, Alice judges
that she is very unlikely to win the lottery. So she works on the assumption that
she will still be in salaried employment next month.
A retrodictive argument moves in the reverse direction. After the data has come
in, one uses the information to revise, or update one’s original probability assign-
ment. For instance, after observing a run of 24 heads, one rejects the hypothesis
that the coin is fair.
The two examples discussed above—the 24 coin tosses, and Alices lottery ticket—
seem to differ very little so far as the predictive aspect is concerned (though I will
argue in Section 10 that the concept of FAPP impossibility involves some subtleties
8even in the predictive case). On the other hand there seems to be a major difference
from the retrodictive point of view. It is on that that I now want to focus.
The first response of a convinced frequentist might be that the difference is due
to the fact that, whereas in the first case one has an ensemble of 24 events, in the
second case one is dealing with a singular event. However, that cannot be correct.
It is easy to think of situations where one can validly draw retrodictive conclusions
from singular events.
For instance, the probability of a single 226Ra nucleus decaying in the next hour
is 5 × 10−8—about the same as the chance of Alice winning the lottery. Suppose
that a single nucleus, initially believed to be 226Ra, and held in a trap, actually
does decay in less than 1 hour. This might well cause one to doubt whether it really
was a 226Ra nucleus—whether the decay probability really was 5× 10−8.
What is the difference between this example and the example of Alice’s lottery
ticket? In both cases one has a singular event, initially judged to be very improba-
ble. In the second case the occurrence of this event leads us to question the initial
probability assignment whereas in the first it does not. Why is that? What is the
underlying logical principle on which the decision depends?
I am going to argue (here, and in Sections 5–8) that the difference has to do with
our background assumptions. We know that it is easy to mis-identify a single nu-
cleus and so, when the supposed 226Ra nucleus decays much sooner than expected,
that naturally increases our readiness to embrace the alternative hypothesis, that
the experimenter made a mistake. On the other hand, the suggestion that the lot-
tery might have been biased specifically in Alice’s favour (as opposed to one of the
other 224 ticket holders) initially strikes us as comparatively implausible.
One’s judgment regarding the lottery might be different if one knew more about
it. Suppose, for instance, one knew that Bob, who runs the lottery, is Alice’s best
friend. Then one might see the event, that Alice wins the lottery, as cause for
suspicion.
Suppose that Alice’s winning ticket is number 5,592,405. This would not usually
be seen as suspicious. Suppose, however, one noticed that in base 4 her ticket
number is 111111111111, and suppose one then discovered that the lottery outcome
is generated by tossing a tetrahedral die 12 times. Then the fact that this was the
winning number might seem very suspicious.
We get some further insight into the role of background assumptions from a
modification of Goodman’s [54] well-known “grue” argument. Goodman uses this
idea to analyze inductive reasoning. However, a related argument applies to retro-
dictive probabilistic reasoning (which can be seen as a generalized form of inductive
reasoning).
Goodman defines “grue” to be the property ordinarily called “green” before a
certain time t, and the property ordinarily called “blue” afterwards. Before t every
observed emerald has been grue (which is to say green). A naive inductive argument
would then suggest that observed emeralds will also be grue (which is to say blue)
after time t.
To apply this idea in the case of interest here, choose some infinite sequence x =
(x1, x2, . . . ) of 0’s and 1’s. For the sake of definiteness, let us take x to be the digits
in the binary expansion of the fractional part of π (so x = (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, . . .)).
On the nth toss define “heils” to be the event “heads” if xn = 1 and “tails” if xn = 0.
Define “taads” to be the event “not heils”.
Suppose now that in 24 tosses we obtain 24 heils and no taads. In conventional
terms this is the sequence HHTTHTTHTTTTHHHHHHTHHTHT consisting of 13
heads and 11 tails, and it would not usually be seen as significant. But if retrodictive
inferences worked in the way that Popper and Gillies think it would have to be seen
9as highly significant. If the hypothesis that the coin is fair is FAPP falsified by 24
heads in succession, then it must, on their principles, also be FAPP falsified by 24
heils in succession.
The reason we would not normally see 24 heils in succession as grounds for doubt-
ing a coin’s fairness has, I believe, to do with our background beliefs. We attach
significance to 24 heads in succession because we can envisage a physical mechanism
by which the coin plausibly might be biased in favour of heads. By contrast, a bias
in favour of heils seems, on physical grounds, comparatively implausible.
Our assessment might be different if our background knowledge was greater.
Suppose, for instance, we knew that the coin was ferromagnetic, and suppose we also
knew that there was a powerful electromagnet in the vicinity which was switched
on when xn = 0, and off when xn = 1. In that case we might consider 24 heils in
succession to be no less significant than 24 heads in succession.
Probabilistic reasoning is, in short, very sensitive to context. I will develop
this point in Section 5–9. I will resume my discussion of the frequentist idea in
Section 10.
4. Propensities
Although Popper began as a frequentist he later switched to a propensity in-
terpretation [55, 56, 57]. A substantial part of the philosophical community has
followed him in this (see Gillies [19, 53] and references cited therein).
Popper saw this development as an evolution in his thought (albeit an important
evolution), not a clean break with the past. Furthermore, it is a step which von
Mises to some extent anticipated, as Howson and Urbach [35] (p. 221) remark.
According to von Mises [38] (p.14)
“The probability of a 6 is a physical property of a given die and is
a property analogous to its mass, specific heat, or electrical resis-
tance. Similarly, for a given pair of dice (including of course the
total setup) the probability of a ‘double 6’ is a characteristic prop-
erty, a physical constant belonging to the experiment as a whole
and comparable with all its other physical properties. The the-
ory of probability is only concerned with relations existing between
physical quantities of this kind. ”
There are, of course, some important differences between Popper and von Mises. In
particular, Popper admits objective single-case probabilities. Gillies [19] (p. 114),
however, argues that this is not essential to the propensity concept. Furthermore,
the fact that von Mises defines probabilities counter-factually (see Section 2) shows
that he is really thinking of them as dispositional properties (defined contextually,
relative to the “experiment as a whole”, as he puts it in the above passage). In
short, it seems to me that, although von Mises is usually described as a frequentist,
he is in fact a propensity theorist.
I doubt whether there can ever really have been a pure frequency theorist: i.e. a
frequentist who actually denies that “the probability of a 6 is a physical property
of a given die . . . (including of course the total setup)”. Such a position would have
some very peculiar consequences.
The pure frequentist position would (presumably) be that a probability just is a
(limiting) relative frequency in some ensemble: absolutely any ensemble, irrespec-
tive of how it is defined. It could be the ensemble which consists of all the throws
of a particular coin. But it could equally well be the ensemble which consists of
104 throws of one coin, followed by 104 throws of a different coin. It could even be
the ensemble which consists of 104 throws of a coin, followed by 104 Stern-Gerlach
measurements.
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Suppose one really did make no distinction between these cases. Then it would
not only be legitimate to argue
because this coin has come up heads on approximately 50% of the
last 104 tosses, therefore this same coin may be expected to come
up heads on approximately 50% of the next 104 tosses.
It would be equally legitimate to argue
because this British penny has come up heads on approximately
50% of the last 104 tosses, therefore that American dollar may be
expected to come up heads on approximately 50% of the next 104
tosses.
It would even be legitimate to argue
because this British penny has come up heads on approximately
50% of the last 104 tosses, therefore a Stern-Gerlach arrangement
may be expected to give the result “spin up” in approximately 50%
of the next 104 measurements.
I believe that no frequentist would argue like this. I think that must mean that
every supposed frequentist is in fact tacitly operating with some kind of propensity
notion.
None of this detracts from the importance of Popper’s shift to a propensity
approach. Popper took an idea which, though tacitly present all along, had never
been sufficiently emphasized, and he placed it centre stage. This was a significant
step.
The concept of a propensity is clearly implied by the way that physicists talk.
For instance half-lives are typically tabulated next to masses, as if they were just
one more physical property. However, I do not think it is simply a matter of
language. It seems to me that the concept plays an essential role in the internal
logic of current physical theories.
Suppose, for instance, Alice takes a large sample of 228Ac nuclei in her laboratory
in London, and finds that approximately 50% of them have decayed after 6 hours.
Then she can legitimately infer that
approximately 50% of a sample of 228Ac nuclei in Calcutta may
be expected to decay in 6 hours.
But she cannot legitimately infer that
approximately 50% of a sample of 226Ra nuclei in London may
be expected to decay in 6 hours.
The fact that this point is obvious should not be seen as detracting from its im-
portance. Basic logical principles generally do seem obvious. Suppose one wanted
to programme a robot to understand logical arguments, and perform physical ex-
periments. Then the robot would go badly wrong if one failed to programme it
with modus ponens (the principle that, if P is true, and P ⇒ Q, then Q is true). It
would also go badly wrong if one failed to programme it with the information that
a half-life is tied to the nuclear species, not to the place it was measured.
Of course, in other contexts a probability can be tied to a spatio-temporal loca-
tion. This happens in quantum field theory, for example. The point I am making is
simply that the idea of a probability being logically tied to some non-probabilistic
physical entity plays an essential logical6 role in our current physical theories. And
6The reader may question my use of the word “logical”. Science depends on the procedure by
which we uncertainly infer, from observations of one set of events, predictions about other events.
Since it is a matter of drawing inferences this procedure may fairly be described as “logical”.
Keynes [26] attempted to explicate probabilistic reasoning in terms of a novel kind of non-
deductive logic. Ramsey [43] criticized that idea. In so far as it is directed at Keynes’s specific
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it is that concept, of a logically bound probability, which I take to be what is
essentially meant by the term “propensity”.
As I am presenting it here the concept of a propensity is, first and foremost, a
logical concept. Under the influence of Popper philosophers have tended to view
propensities as physically real properties. But the logical concept, as I have formu-
lated it here, is consistent with an epistemic point of view.
The trouble with thinking of propensities in the way that Popper suggests is
that it prompts questions like: what exactly is the difference between (1) a 228Ac
nucleus which decays after 26 hours in spite of having had a propensity to decay
much sooner and (2) a 228Ac nucleus which simply decays after that many hours,
without being troubled by any conflicting propensity? It seems clear that any
difference there may be is unobservable.
If one looks at propensities as objectively real properties they are likely to seem
empirically irrelevant. If however, one looks at them from a logical perspective7 then
it can be seen that they are highly relevant, even though they are unobservable.
It is not, in general, necessary for an entity to be directly observable in order for
it to be empirically relevant. It is enough that it be non-redundantly embedded in
a structure of empirical thought. The state vector is not directly observable; nor
are logical relations. But they could not be considered empirically irrelevant.
5. Retrodictive Inferences: the Bayesian Methodology
I argued in Section 2 that retrodictive inferences depend on background as-
sumptions. Those assumptions are themselves probabilistic in character. Their
role emerges most clearly in the Bayesian approach, discussed in this section. I will
discuss the orthodox theory of statistical inference in the next section.
The term “Bayesian” tends to be associated with an epistemic interpretation of
probability. However, there are objectivists who favour the Bayesian methodology.
I argued that von Mises, though usually described as a frequentist, is really a
propensity theorist. He is, besides, a Bayesian (see von Mises [38] pp. 117–25,
157–9 and von Mises [39], chapters VII and X).
I myself take an epistemic view. However, for the purposes of this paper it is more
appropriate to present the Bayesian methodology from an objectivist perspective,
proposal it seems to me that Ramsey’s criticism is justified. On the other hand Ramsey (possibly)
and de Finetti [31] (definitely) have suggested that probabilistic reasoning can be based purely on
the principles of deductive logic (via the Dutch book construction). I am not persuaded by that
proposal either.
At the beginning of the 1930’s Wittgenstein [58, 59] took to using the word “grammar” in
preference to the word “logic” (in this connection it may be worth noting that Wittgenstein cites
Ramsey as a major influence on his thinking in the preface to Wittgenstein [60]). I choose not
to use the word “grammar” here because grammar has nothing specially to do with reasoning,
and because grammatical principles are, to a considerable extent, arbitrary (pace Chomsky).
Nevertheless, the concept I have in mind is at least as close to the concept Wittgenstein intends
by the word “grammar” as it is to the concept Keynes intends by the word “logic”.
7In contrasting this with the idea that a propensity is an objectively real property I do not
mean to suggest that it is therefore subjective. I think the subject-object dichotomy is potentially
very misleading. I do not believe the world genuinely is sundered, absolutely, quite in the manner
this terminology suggests. Like Bohr I think that is the single most important lesson of quantum
mechanics.
Wittgenstein [58] (pp.126–7) asks “How do I know that the colour red can’t be cut into bits?”
This is surely not an empirical observation. However, although the proposition can hardly be
described as an observed fact, or something inferred from observed facts, it seems to me that it
cannot appropriately be described as “subjective”.
I would argue that logical relationships are constitutive of what we normally think of as reality
(c.f., for example, Wittgenstein [59], p.116, where he speaks of the “logical form” of a patch in
the visual field).
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such as that of von Mises. I want to expose the deficiencies of the objectivist idea.
The best way to do that is to adopt objectivist assumptions, and see where they
lead.
Also, I want to compare the Bayesian approach with what is now the orthodox
approach. This was developed by Fisher and others in the first few decades of the
last century in conscious opposition to the Bayesian methodology. If one wants to
understand Fisher’s reasons for rejecting the Bayesian approach one needs to look
at it through objectivist eyes.
Let si = 0 (respectively 1) if the coin comes up tails (respectively heads) on the
ith toss. Let s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) be the sequence describing the result of the first
n tosses. Let p be the true probability of heads (I am following von Mises’s objec-
tivist account, so I am assuming that there does exist a real, objective probability
of heads). Then, if the tosses are independent, the probability of obtaining the
sequence s is
P (s|p) = ph(s)(1 − p)n−h(s) (4)
where h(s) =
∑n
i=1 si is the number of heads.
Now if it was a certain fact that the coin was fair we would have p = 1/2 and
every sequence s would have the same probability 1/2n. Suppose, however, that the
coin was randomly selected from a large population of coins, not all of which are
fair. Let fi(p)dp be the probability that the probability of heads is in the interval
(p, p+ dp). Then the unconditional probability of obtaining the sequence s is
P (s) =
∫ 1
0
P (s|p)fi(p)dp . (5)
Suppose, now, that we do toss the coin n times, and suppose we obtain the sequence
s. Then, by an application of Bayes’s theorem, the probability that the probability
of heads is in the interval (p, p+ dp), conditional on this new information, is
P (p|s)dp =
P (s|p)fi(p)dp∫ 1
0 P (s|p)fi(p)dp
. (6)
Setting ff(p) = P (p|s) this gives, in view of Eq. (4),
ff(p) = Kp
h(s)(1− p)n−h(s)fi(p) (7)
where K is a normalization constant. fi(p) is usually called the prior (or a priori)
distribution, and ff(p) the posterior (or a posteriori) distribution.
It will be observed that von Mises explicitly appeals to the concept of a second-
order probability: a probability of a probability. Savage [32] (p. 58), among others,
has criticized this idea. However, if one accepts von Mises’s objectivist viewpoint
the concept must be regarded as legitimate8. As we saw von Mises, though usually
described as a frequentist, is in fact a propensity theorist. That is he thinks that the
probability of a coin coming up heads is a physical property of that particular coin
(plus the tossing method) (von Mises [38], p. 14). If one makes that assumption,
and if it is legitimate to consider the probability that the mass m of a randomly
selected coin lies in a certain interval, then it must be equally legitimate to consider
the probability that the probability p of the coin coming up heads lies in a certain
interval.
To understand the significance of Eq. (7) (as von Mises sees it) consider, for
simplicity, a case where there are only two possible values of p. Imagine a bag
8Of course, from de Finetti’s [31] viewpoint it makes no sense to interpret fi(p)dp as a prob-
ability (on de Finetti’s assumptions a second order probability would have to represent a belief
about one’s own belief, not a belief about the object of interest). de Finetti has found a most
ingenious way round this difficulty. In his scheme the weight function fi(p) encodes a probability
distribution, without itself being a probability distribution.
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containing a large number of fair coins, with p = 0.5, and a much smaller number of
biased coins, with p = 0.9. For the sake of definiteness suppose that the proportion
of biased coins is 10−4.
Now consider the experiment which consists in shaking the bag, selecting a coin
at random, tossing the coin 30 times, and then replacing it. Suppose this experiment
is repeated infinitely many times. Let Si be the set of all such experiments, and
let Sf be the subset obtained by selecting just those cases where the coin came up
heads on each of the 30 tosses. Then Si is described by the distribution
fi(p) = 0.9999 δ(p− 0.5) + 0.0001 δ(p− 0.9) (8)
while Sf is described by the distribution
ff(p) = 0.0002 δ(p− 0.5) + 0.9998 δ(p− 0.9) (9)
(as follows from Eq. (7)). In the set of all experiments the coin is fair in 99.99% of
cases. But in the subset of experiments in which the coin comes up heads on each
of 30 tosses, the coin is biased in 99.98% of cases.
It will seen from Eq. (7) that, in a Bayesian inference, the conclusion to the
argument (the distribution ff) is produced by the interplay between a probabilistic
premise (the distribution fi) and a set of factual observations (the sequence s). It is
this interplay which explains the point I made in Section 3, that some observations
force a major change in our beliefs while others, though equally improbable on our
starting assumptions, do not.
It seems to von Mises that the Bayesian methodology provides a perfectly clear,
fully objective theory of retrodictive probabilistic reasoning. He is at a loss to
understand why it is not more widely accepted [38] (pp.158–9):
I do not understand the many beautiful words used by Fisher and
his followers in support of the likelihood theory . . .
. . .We can only hope that statisticians will return to the use of the
simple, lucid reasoning of Bayes’s conceptions.
de Finetti’s epistemic interpretation of probability is at the opposite pole from von
Mises’s objectivism. However, he and von Mises are at one in their attitude to
orthodox statistics. de Finetti [31] (p. 245) says, for example,
“Those who reject the Bayesian approach cannot base their infer-
ences on the posterior distribution even if they wished to—it does
not make sense so far as they are concerned. As a result, they are
forced to have recourse to ad hoc criteria, and hence to open the
floodgates to arbitrariness. . . . The best they can . . . do is to base
themselves on the likelihood function; failing that, they simply re-
sort to playing with formulae that are without any real foundation.”
I will argue below that these criticisms of the orthodox methodology are justi-
fied. However, I first want to examine Fisher’s reasons for rejecting the Bayesian
approach.
Fisher [61] (also see Fisher [62]) gives a detailed discussion of the Bayesian
methodology9. He is at pains to defend it against most of the attacks which have
been made on it. He argues [61] (pp. 8–38) that criticism has mainly been directed
at inappropriate applications of the method, which fail to respect the conditions of
Bayes’s theorem, and that the method itself is perfectly sound. He also says [61]
(p. 48) that there can be no fundamental objection to second-order probabilities:
9von Mises [38] (p. 159) says “Fisher emphatically avoids all reference to Bayes’s solution of the
problem of inference; this is for him a matter of principle”. von Mises presumably wrote this for
the first edition of his book, before he had read Fisher [61]. At any rate, it is a misapprehension.
Fisher does not dismiss the Bayesian methodology out of hand, without argument.
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probabilities of probabilities. His only objection to the Bayesian method is that the
prior fi is, in practice, usually unknown. This means that, in most cases, Eq. (7)
merely expresses one unknown in terms of another.
It is generally true that the Bayesian can only get a probabilistic judgment out,
as the conclusion to a piece of retrodictive reasoning, if s/he begins by feeding a
probabilistic judgment in, as an initial assumption. Fisher’s point is that, in most
(though not all—see Fisher [61], pp. 18–20 and 127–132) applications, that initial
assumption cannot be based on known facts about the objective situation. In his
view that makes the Bayesian method, in most applications, scientifically useless.
von Mises [39] (pp. 339–45) (also see von Mises [38], pp. 122–4) has a response to
this objection. If n is large then ph(s)(1−p)n−h(s) ≈ K ′δ(p−p0) where p0 = h(s)/n
andK ′ is a normalization constant. Inserting this expression in Eq. (7) one obtains,
on the assumption that fi satisfies certain conditions (which von Mises explicitly
states)
ff(p) ≈ δ(p− p0) (10)
independently of fi. von Mises infers that if one obtains r heads in n coin tosses,
and if n is sufficiently large, then it is nearly certain that p ≈ r/n.
His response is inadequate for two reasons. In the first place fi might not satisfy
von Mises’s conditions. If, for example, fi(p) = δ(p − 0.5), then ff(p) = δ(p − 0.5)
whatever the values of r and n. von Mises would doubtless argue that his conditions
are very plausible. However, the fact is that they are empirically unfounded. No
set of observations could ever contradict the assignment fi(p) = δ(p− 0.5).
The second problem is that, even if we accept von Mises’s conditions, there is
no empirical criterion to tell us how large n must be for it to be nearly certain that
p ≈ r/n. Suppose, for instance, we have obtained 60 heads in 100 tosses. For some
choices of fi this would be very strong evidence that the coin is biased; for others
it would not. The question, as to which alternative applies, cannot be decided
empirically.
In the case of a die von Mises [38] (p. 123) suggests that 500 throws should
be enough to give a reliable estimate of the true probabilities. But he does not
adequately explain where this number is coming from. It cannot be inferred just
from the observations, without additional assumptions.
Fisher, like von Mises, takes an objectivist view. I think he must be correct to
think that, seen from that perspective, this feature of the Bayesian methodology
is unacceptable. The trouble is that the orthodox methodology, which Fisher and
others devised in an attempt to get round the problem, does no better.
6. Retrodictive Inferences: the Orthodox Methodology
A Bayesian argument takes an initial probability assignment P (the prior fi),
adds to it some factual data F , and from this derives a new probability assignment
Q (the posterior ff). Formally:
P ∧ F ⇒ Q . (11)
Fisher’s problem is that all we observe is the factual data F . He consequently thinks
that, if probability assignments are not to float free of any empirical attachment, it
is essential that Bayesian inferences of the form (11) be supplemented with a new
kind of inference having the general form
F ⇒ Q (12)
where a probability assignment Q is inferred directly from the factual data F ,
without the assistance of any prior probabilistic assumption (see, for example,
Fisher [61], pp. 54–5). In this section I hope to convince the reader that valid
inferences of this form do not exist.
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I believe that Fisher is entirely correct in thinking that the dependence of
Bayesian inferences on prior probabilistic assumptions is a serious difficulty for
one of his philosophical persuasion. Where he goes wrong is in thinking that this
is a reason for rejecting the Bayesian methodology. It is not just Bayesian infer-
ences which have the form of Eq. (11), but every retrodictive probabilistic inference,
without exception.
Consider
Alice’s argument: Alice spins a roulette wheel once and obtains
the number 13. She concludes that the wheel is fair.
This argument is clearly invalid. A single spin of a roulette wheel tells one virtually
nothing about the underlying probability distribution. The fact that the number 13
came up once, in a single spin of the wheel, does not imply that the other numbers
are even possible, much less that they each have probability 1/37. It also seems a
little strange to argue that, because 13 did occur, therefore 13 is not very likely to
occur—an anti-inductive argument, as it might be called.
Now compare
Bob’s argument: Bob tosses a coin 1000 times and obtains 500
heads. He concludes that (0.459, 0.541) is a 99% confidence interval
for the probability p of the coin coming up heads.
It may appear that Bob has solid reasons for this conclusion. But in fact, if Bob is
claiming to extract his conclusion just from the empirical data, without additional
assumptions, then his claim is no better founded than Alice’s.
A sequence of 1000 coin tosses is equivalent to 1 spin of a big roulette wheel,
divided into 21000 sectors. Let b be the particular sequence which Bob obtains.
Then, on the basis of one spin of the equivalent roulette wheel, Bob is arguing
Because sector b did occur, therefore each of the sectors which did
not occur has probability ≥ 6× 10−339
He is also arguing anti-inductively:
Because b did occur, therefore b is very unlikely to occur.
If Bob really was basing himself just on the observed facts, and nothing else what-
ever, his argument would have the same extraordinary features as Alice’s argument.
It would clearly be invalid.
Of course, Bob is not really basing himself just on the factual data. He is
supplementing the factual observation
F = “coin tossed 1000 times and sequence s obtained”
with the prior probabilistic assumption
P = “tosses are independent, and probability of heads is constant”
P is logically equivalent to the statement that, for some fixed 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, the
probability of obtaining an arbitrary sequence s is
P (s) = ph(s)(1 − p)1000−h(s) (13)
(where h(s) is the number of heads in the sequence s, as before).
The set of all probability distributions on the space of sequences of 1000 heads
and tails is a (21000 − 1) parameter family. The assumption P restricts the class of
admissible distributions to the one parameter family specified by Eq. (13). That
is a severe restriction. Without such a restriction no valid, non-trivial retrodictive
inference is possible.
If the class of admissible distributions is suitably restricted, then one can legit-
imately draw probabilistic conclusions from a single spin of an ordinary roulette
wheel.
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To see this let Hl be the hypothesis
P (r) =
{
1
10 if l ≤ r ≤ l + 9
0 otherwise
(14)
where l = 0, 1, . . . , 28 and P (r) is the probability of obtaining the number r when
the wheel is spun once.
Now let
F =“wheel was spun once and number 13 was obtained”
and let P be the disjunction
P =
∨28
l=0Hl
F on its own has virtually no probabilistic implications (beyond the obvious im-
plication, that 13 was possible and that none of the other numbers was certain).
However, the conjunction P ∧F does have substantial probabilistic implications10:
namely, the proposition Q =
∨13
l=4Hl.
If Alice is permitted to assume P then she can validly argue, for example,
(a) because 13 did occur, therefore 12 and 14 are not both impossible.
and
(b) because 13 did occur, therefore 13 has probability 1/10.
However, she is only getting these probabilistic conclusions out because she be-
gan by feeding a probabilistic assumption in. In particular, the superficially anti-
inductive character of inference (b) is not mysterious. Alice only arrives at the
conclusion, that 13 is unlikely to occur, because she began by assuming that 13 is
unlikely to occur. If P is true, then the probability of 13 is necessarily ≤ 1/10.
Alice is, in fact, assigning the maximum probability consistent with her starting
assumptions.
This example—Alice’s modified argument, as I will call it—is admittedly arti-
ficial. However, the same idea of assuming a disjunction P , and then using the
observations to narrow it down to a smaller disjunction Q is at the root of many,
if not all orthodox statistical inferences.
Let us go back to the example of 1000 coin tosses. Let Hp be the hypothesis
“tosses are independent, and the probability of heads is p on every toss”. If Hp
is true the probability of obtaining the sequence s with h(s) heads is ph(s)(1 −
p)1000−h(s). Unlike the distributions in Alice’s modified argument, this distribution
is everywhere non-zero (unless p = 0 or 1). However, it is sharply peaked at h(s) =
1000p. Orthodox statisticians take it that, away from this peak, the distribution
may be regarded as effectively zero. They think this entitles them to proceed in
the same manner as Alice, in her modified argument. They begin by assuming the
disjunction P =
∨
p∈[0,1]Hp, and then use the observed sequence s to narrow this
down to a disjunction Q =
∨
p∈Ic
Hp, where Ic is a confidence interval.
For example, suppose as before that a sequence b containing 500 heads is ob-
tained. Let E− (respectively E+) be the event that the number of heads is ≤ 500
(respectively ≥ 500). Let P (E±|Hp) be the conditional probability of E± given Hp.
Then
P (E+|Hp) ≤ 0.005 (15)
when p ≤ 0.459 while
P (E−|Hp) ≤ 0.005 (16)
when p ≥ 0.541. If P (E+|Hp) = 0 whenever p ≤ 0.459 and P (E−|Hp) = 0 whenever
p ≥ 0.541 we would be in the same situation as Alice, in her modified argument.
We could conclude that p certainly ∈ (0.459, 0.541) (modulo the qualification in
10 At least, it does if one is allowed to assume that zero probability events are impossible.
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footnote 10). As it is the conditional probabilities 6= 0, and so certainty would
not be justified. The probabilities are, nevertheless, small. Orthodox statisticians
consider that this entitles us to be, in some sense, confident that p ∈ (0.459, 0.541).
The orthodox analysis depends, not just on the factual data, but also on the
probabilistic assumption P =
∨
p∈[0,1]Hp. This assumption is no more empirical
than the choice of Bayesian prior.
In Section 3 I appealed to the idea that a coin might be systematically biased in
favour of heils: i.e. biased towards heads on some tosses and tails on others. This
suggestion may have seemed fanciful. But it does in fact describe what a classi-
cal determinist like Laplace [25] believed to be true in objective reality. Laplace
thought that for a superhuman being, who had complete knowledge of the objective
situation, the probability of heads on any particular toss would always be either
0 or 1. In other words, he thought that if “heils” and “taads” are appropriately
defined then, for such a being, the probability of heils is always 1.
The de Broglie-Bohm theory [63, 64] indicates that the empirical predictions of
quantum mechanics are consistent with complete determinism at the micro-level.
Consider, for example, a measurement of σˆz on a succession of particles each initially
in an eigenstate of σˆx. We cannot, at present, empirically exclude the possibility
that, for each particle that passes through the apparatus, the measurement outcome
is fully determined by the initial conditions. Consequently there is, at present, no
way to empirically decide between the hypotheses:
A: For every particle the probability of obtaining the result “spin-up” is 1/2
B: For every particle the probability of obtaining the result “spin-up” is either
0 or 1.
Nor is there any obvious way to empirically exclude
C: For every particle the probability of obtaining the result “spin-up” is either
0.4 or 0.6.
—not to mention other, more complicated possibilities.
Analogous considerations apply to the proposal that the measurement outcomes
are statistically independent. Let Xn be the n
th measurement outcome. There is
no obvious way to empirically discriminate
A′: P (X2n = X2n+1) = 1/2 for all n.
B′: P (X2n = X2n+1) = 0 for some values of n and 1 for others
C′: P (X2n = X2n+1) = 0.4 for some values of n and 0.6 for others.
(not to mention other, more complicated possibilities).
Similar remarks apply to the coin-tossing example.
It may be suggested that the assumption P =
∨
p∈[0,1]Hp seems very plausible.
I would agree with that: it seems very plausible to me also. However, that has no
bearing on my argument here. I am here only making the simple logical point, that
P represents an additional assumption, not contained in the empirical data.
Hume [47, 48] argued that we have no sufficient empirical reason for expecting
the sun to rise tomorrow. The contrary proposal, that the sun will probably not
rise tomorrow, does—of course—seem very implausible. But Hume does not deny
that. His point is not that our ordinary belief is not very plausible, but only that
it cannot logically be derived purely from the observed facts, without any non-
empirical input. The same is true of conclusions reached by the kind of generalized
inductive argument considered here.
One might try to argue that the assumption
∨
p∈[0,1]Hp can be justified by
appealing to the results of previous coin-tossing experiments. However, any con-
clusions drawn from those previous experiments would themselves have to depend
on previous prior assumptions. Trying to justify probability by probability is like
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trying to justify induction by induction: it cannot be done, unless the pump has
first been primed, by some initial non-empirical assumption.
7. Orthodox v. Bayesian
In the last section I argued that the orthodox methodology relies on prior, non-
empirical assumptions, just like the Bayesian methodology. However, it may look as
though the orthodox methodology is still preferable because it does not require us
to make so many such assumptions. As we saw in Section 5, von Mises’s objectivist
version of the Bayesian methodology11, as applied to the coin-tossing example, relies
on the prior assumption
∨
p∈[0,1]Hp, just as the orthodox approach does. But it
also relies on the prior distribution fi. By contrast, it may appear that the orthodox
approach does not make any non-empirical assumption additional to
∨
p∈[0,1]Hp.
However, it will be found on closer examination that this is not correct. As-
sumptions corresponding to the distribution fi play an essential role in the ortho-
dox approach. The only difference is that, whereas in the Bayesian approach these
assumptions are explicitly built into the formalism, in the orthodox approach they
are tacit, and often unrecognized. All that the orthodox statistician achieves by
suppressing the function fi is to produce a misleading appearance of greater objec-
tivity, at the price of a serious loss of logical coherence. In particular, the orthodox
methodology obscures the point which emerged from the discussion in Section 3:
that retrodictive inferences are critically dependent on our background knowledge
and beliefs.
I noted at the end of Section 5 that the Bayesian approach fails to give a purely
objective criterion for deciding how many tosses are needed to tell whether a coin
is biased. Suppose, for instance, a coin comes up heads on 60 out of 100 successive
tosses. For some choices of prior distribution fi this will imply that there probably
is a substantial bias, for others it will not. On these grounds Fisher rejects the
Bayesian methodology. Yet the alternative methodology which he advocates is no
more objective.
On the hypothesis that the coin is fair (and the tosses independent) the probabil-
ity that heads will come up more than 60 times in 100 successive tosses is 0.028. So
if we perform a one-tailed test the hypothesis, that the coin is fair, will be rejected
at the 95% level, but not at the 99% level of significance. If, on the other hand,
we perform a two-tailed test the hypothesis will not be rejected even at the 95%
level (though it will be rejected at the 90% level). So do we accept that the coin is
biased or not? That, it seems, is up to the subjective decision of the statistician.
Fisher [61] (p. 45) has this to say, regarding the choice of significance level:
“no scientific worker has a fixed level of significance at which from
year to year, and in all circumstances, he rejects hypotheses; he
rather gives his mind to each particular case in the light of his
evidence and his ideas”
In other words, the choice of significance level depends on exactly the same factors
which determine the choice of Bayesian prior: namely, the background knowledge
and beliefs of the statistician. Similarly with the decision as to whether to use a
one-tailed or a two-tailed test.
The orthodox methodology might be considered superior to the Bayesianmethod-
ology if the statement, that H is rejected at the 95% level, meant that H is false
with probability ≥ 0.95. However, the statement cannot validly be interpreted in
11In de Finetti’s [31] epistemic version Eq. (7) is derived by a different route, in which∨
p∈[0,1] Hp is replaced by the assumption of exchangeability. The end mathematical result is
the same, but the conceptualisation is quite different (see, however, Howson and Urbach [35],
pp. 232–3).
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this way, as orthodox statisticians are at pains to emphasize. A significance level is
not a probability (as is already apparent from the fact that it depends on whether
the test is one-tailed or two-tailed).
The fact that orthodox statistical conclusions are not purely objective tends to be
obscured by the fact that orthodox statisticians standardly choose to work at only
a small number of different signficance levels (typically 95% or 99%). However, the
fact that everyone judges the same is not, in itself, a reason for taking a judgment
to be objective. In any case, Bayesian statisticians could achieve an equal degree of
unanimity by the simple expedient of always working in terms of the uniform prior
fi(p) = 1 (as, indeed, was originally recommended by Bayes and Laplace [25]).
The orthodox methodology is not superior in point of objectivity. On the other
hand it is clearly inferior in point of logical cogency.
The argument we have been considering may be summarized as follows:
Argument 1:
If the coin is fair (and the tosses independent) the probability of more than
60 heads in 100 tosses is ≤ 0.05.
The coin did came up heads on 60 out of 100 tosses.
therefore
The hypothesis, that the coin is fair, is rejected at the 95% level.
Now campare this with the example I discussed in Section 3, where Alice wins a
lottery having 224 tickets. Suppose one were to reason as follows:
Argument 2:
If the lottery is fair the probability of Alice winning = 6× 10−8.
Alice did win.
therefore
The hypothesis, that the lottery is fair, is rejected at the 99.99999% level.
If argument 1 is valid just as it stands (if the conclusion does not tacitly depend
on some additional, inexplicit asssumptions), then it is hard to see what objection
there can be to argument 2.
It might be suggested that argument 2 is invalid because the conclusion is based
on a singular event. However, as we saw in Section 3, it is easy to think of cases
where one can validly draw retrodictive conclusions from singular occurrences. Be-
sides, if one wants to erect it as an absolute principle, that retrodictive conclusions
must be based on repeated trials, one has to decide just how many repetitions are
needed. It is hard to see how the decision can be other than arbitrary.
In any case one can find sufficiently many logical obscurities in the orthodox
analysis of the coin-tossing problem. Argument 1 depends on grouping the par-
ticular sequence containing 60 heads which did occur together with all the other
sequences containing 60 or more heads which did not occur. It is hard to see, on
orthodox principles, any compelling reason for adopting this procedure. However,
if we did try basing ourselves just on the sequence which actually occurs it would
lead to some strange conclusions.
Suppose, for instance, that a coin is tossed 100 times, and a sequence s containing
50 heads is obtained. This would usually be seen as favouring the hypothesis that
the coin is fair. However, if retrodictive inferences really were based just on “the
resistance felt by the normal mind to accepting a story intrinsically too improbable”
(Fisher [61], p. 43) it is hard to see what objection there could be to
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Argument 3:
If the coin is fair (and the tosses independent) the probability that s will
occur = 7.9× 10−31.
s did occur.
therefore
The hypothesis, that the coin is fair, is rejected at the 99.99 · · ·9% level.
(see Howson and Urbach [35], p. 123).
Of course, no orthodox statistician would argue in that fashion. The question is:
why? I do not see how it is possible, on orthodox principles alone, to explain, in
clear, logically compelling terms, why argument 1 is valid while arguments 2 and 3
are not.
Although Jaynes [46] has argued that the orthodox methodology is often not the
most effective way to extract conclusions from statistical data, I believe no one has
questioned the actual validity of conclusions reached by orthodox means. However
it is, I think, difficult to disagree with de Finetti [31] (p. 245) when he says that
orthodox statistics relies on a multiplicity of ad hoc decisions, whose logical basis
is often far from clear12.
Jeffreys [24] (p. 393), contrasting his Bayesian approach with Fisher’s orthodox
one, comments
I have in fact been struck repeatedly in my own work, after being
led on general principles to the solution of a problem, to find that
Fisher had already grasped the essentials by some brilliant piece of
common sense.
In other words Fisher, notwithstanding his lack of logical system, generally gets
the right answer due to the power of his intuition (Jaynes [46] (p. 199) also pays
tribute to the depth of Fisher’s intuitive insight). Bell [9] (p. 174) remarks that the
Copenhagen formulation of quantum mechanics, in spite of the obscurity of its basic
concepts, is still enormously successful on a practical level due to the “discretion
and good taste” of its practitioners. The orthodox approach to statistics is equally
reliant on these qualities of discretion and good taste.
If one was simply interested in practical problems of error-analysis, epidemi-
ology and the like, the orthodox approach might be satisfactory (see, however,
Jaynes [46]). However, the reader of this article is likely to be interested in the
foundational problems of science (as, it should be said, is Fisher). From that point
of view the logically unsystematic character of the orthodox approach is a serious
disadvantage, for it tends to obscure the real character of probabilistic reasoning.
The Bayesian methodology is greatly preferable.
If one looks at it in Bayesian terms it is easy to see why the conclusion to
argument 1 is valid, whereas the conclusions to arguments 2 and 3 are both invalid.
Let us first formulate the Bayesian approach in general terms. Suppose we have
a set of hypotheses H1, H2, . . . , (for simplicity assumed discrete), and suppose we
assume that
∨
iHi is true, so the prior probabilities satisfy
∑
i P (Hi) = 1. Let E
be the observed outcome. Then the posterior probability of Hi given the data E is
P (Hi|E) =
P (E|Hi)P (Hi)
P (E)
(17)
12Howson and Urbach [35] (p. 124) say that Fisher is not really a falsificationist like Popper
(as Gillies [19] (p. 147) maintains), but rather a quasi-falsificationist. I think that is probably a
fair description, provided “quasi-falsificationism” is not taken to be a coherent system of logical
thought.
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where P (E) =
∑
i P (E|Hi)P (Hi). The conditional probability P (E|Hi) is often
called the likelihood of Hi relative to the data E.
There are two points to notice about this formula: (1) the posterior depends on
an interaction between the likelihoods P (E|Hi) and the priors P (Hi); and (2) the
factor P (E) in the denominator may be, and often is very small—which means that
the posterior P (Hi|E) may be, and often is appreciable even when the likelihood
P (E|Hi) is very small.
Orthodox statisticians neglect both these points. Their desire to fit the theory
onto a Procustean bed of pure objectivism makes them try to get everything from
the likelihoods P (E|Hi) alone. The effect is to mutilate the logical structure of the
theory.
Let us now specialize the formula to the case of Alice’s lottery ticket. This will
give a formal basis to the intuitive considerations of Section 3.
Let N be the number of tickets. Let H0 be the hypothesis that the lottery is
fair, and let Hi be the hypothesis that ticket i is certain to win, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
Suppose we take P (H0) = 1 − ǫ and P (Hi) = ǫ/N for i ≥ 1 and some small ǫ
(corresponding to a situation where we think there is a small probablity of the
lottery being rigged in someone’s favour, but have no idea who that someone might
be). Let a be Alice’s ticket, and let E be the event that Alice’s ticket wins. Then
P (H0|E) = P (H0) = (1− ǫ) . (18)
Under these conditions the event, that Alice wins the lottery, does not change
our assessment of the probability of the lottery being rigged—in agreement with
ordinary intuition. Note that P (H0|E) is close to 1 even though the likelihood
P (E|H0) is very small. This is because P (E) is also very small.
Suppose, on the other hand, we attached the same low, prior probability ǫ to the
hypothesis, that the lottery is biased, but were sure that if it is rigged in anyone’s
favour that someone is going to be Alice (corresponding to a situation where we
think the lottery organizer is probably honest, but happen to know that Alice is his
wife). The prior probabilities now are P (H0) = 1 − ǫ and P (Hi) = ǫδia for i ≥ 1.
The posterior probability that the lottery is fair, given that Alice won, is then
P (H0|E) =
1
1 +Nǫ/(1− ǫ)
. (19)
If one took ǫ = 1/N this would give P (H0|E) ≈ 1/2—meaning that, even though we
start out with a strong conviction that the lottery organizer is probably honest, the
event of his wife winning makes us very suspicious. This also agrees with ordinary
intuition.
The paradox which argument 3 apparently represents can also be resolved by
analyzing the problem in Bayesian terms. Let Hp be the hypothesis “tosses are
independent and probability of heads is p on every toss”, and let E be the event
that the particular sequence s containing 50 heads and 50 tails is obtained (as in
argument 3). Suppose we take P (Hp) = 1 for all p. Then Eq. (17) becomes
P (Hp|E) =
P (E|Hp)
P (E)
(20)
where P (E|Hp) = p
50(1−p)50 and P (E) =
∫ 1
0 P (E|Hp)dp = 9.8×10
−32. Argument
3 depends on the fact that the likelihood P (E|H0.5) = 7.9× 10
−31 is very small. If
one bases onself on a supposed “primitive” or “elemental” resistance to accepting
highly improbable stories (Fisher [61], p. 46) this means that the occurrence of E
is grounds for rejecting H0.5. But if one bases oneself on the posterior P (Hp|E), as
one logically should, the paradox dissolves. P (E|Hp) and P (E) are both very small.
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Consequently, their ratio P (Hp|E) is a well-behaved probability density, with total
area = 1, and 96% of its area concentrated in the interval (0.4, 0.6).
8. No “probable” from an “is”
I have several times mentioned Hume’s argument for inductive scepticism. Hume
is also well-known for his fact-value distinction: the principle that one cannot validly
infer an “ought” from an “is”. As he puts it [47] (p. 469):
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the
ordinary way of reasoning . . . when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to
find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is
not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought,
or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of
the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses
some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary . . . that a reason
should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this
new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely
different from it.
The point Hume is making here, that one cannot get a moral injunction out, at
the end of an argument, unless one began by feeding a moral assumption in, at the
start, is nowadays usually taken for granted. However, when Hume first advanced
this proposition it seemed shocking.
Hume’s point is that there exists no valid inference of the form
F ⇒ N (21)
where F is a statement of fact and N is a moral injunction. If N is validly inferred
by an argument having F among its premises, then the inference must be of the
form
M ∧ F ⇒ N (22)
where M is a prior moral assumption.
In Sections 5–7 we saw that a similar principle applies to probabilistic reasoning.
A probability assignment Q cannot be inferred directly from a factual proposition
F without other input13. A retrodictive probabilistic inference must, instead, be of
the form (c.f. Eq. (11))
P ∧ F ⇒ Q (23)
where P is a prior probabilistic assumption.
In short: one cannot get a “probable” from an “is”. Probability statements are,
in most respects, quite unlike moral statements. However, they have this logical
feature in common.
9. Predictive Inferences
Physical thinking has been much influenced by the idea that extremely improba-
ble events are FAPP (“for all practical purposes”) impossible. The idea is attractive
because, by converting extreme probability statements into statements of effective
fact, it seems to circumvent the need to give a clear physical interpretation of
probability as such.
I have argued that in a retrodictive context this idea is unacceptable. On the
other hand, in predictive reasoning I think it (probably) is true that a sufficiently
low probability event counts as FAPP impossible. However, one needs to be careful.
13Except in the trivial case, where one merely infers, from the fact that x occurred, that x was
not impossible, or from the fact that x did not occur, that x was not certain.
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For instance, the probability of Alice winning the lottery is 6 × 10−8. It is
tempting to conclude that she has, from a predictive point of view, effectively no
chance of winning. However, it will appear on further reflection that matters are
less straightforward. It is true that Alice will, if she is wise, take the event of her
winning to be impossible FMPP (“for most practical purposes”). She will not, for
example, make heavy financial commitments which she could not meet, except in
the event of her winning the lottery. But if she really did think it to be impossible
for all practical purposes, she would not have taken the practical step of buying a
ticket in the first place.
This example may appear frivolous. So let us consider a less frivolous one. The
geological record suggests that the probability of the Earth being hit by a 10 km
asteroid some time in the next 50 years is ∼ 10−6. This is significantly greater
than the probability of Alice winning the lottery, but still rather small. If we
judged the probability to be (say) ∼ 0.5 then we might consider it worth devoting
a substantial fraction of the world’s GDP to the problem of trying to avert this
potential catastrophe. But as it is the probability is small, and so we judge it more
appropriate to expend most of the world’s resources on concerns that seem more
pressing. Nevertheless, the US government does expend some of its resources on
the task of tracking asteroids. At least in the view of the US government, a chance
of 10−6 is not FAPP equivalent to a prediction, that the event in question will
certainly not happen.
However, a probability of 10−6 is still comparatively large. It is difficult to see
how considerations of the kind just adduced could apply to probabilities of 10−60,
or 10−600. We do not, for instance, consider it worth insuring against a macroscopic
violation of the second law of thermodynamics.
I am therefore inclined to think that, once a probability is shrunk below a cer-
tain point, the event in question does indeed count as FAPP impossible so far as
prediction is concerned. This point is not very sharply defined. But it appears to
me that a probability of 10−6 is rather clearly on one side, and that a probability
of 10−60 is no less clearly on the other. However, that does not entirely settle the
question. We need to ask where these numbers 10−6 and 10−60 are coming from.
I have been appealing to the idea of a fair bet, where one trades a small stake
for a potentially large gain, and a fair insurance, where one trades a small premium
for protection against a potentially large loss. The trade need not be conceived in
financial terms. This kind of reasoning plays an essential role in medicine (where one
has to balance the debilitating effects of, say, chemotherapy against the potential
gain in health), and in theoretical research (where, when choosing a project, one
has to balance the labour to be expended against the intellectual value of the result,
should the investigation bear fruit). Indeed, I would say that, one way or another,
it plays an essential role in just about every department of life.
The conditions of human life constrain the size of any appropriate stake or pre-
mium. I am inclined to think that the significance of the numbers 10−6 and 10−60
derives from such facts as:
The GDP of the world is ∼ 1016 US cents.
The age of the species Homo Sapiens is ∼ 1013 seconds.
The volume of the solar system (out to the heliopause) is ∼ 1046 cm3.
An alien species, which lived for times greatly in excess of 1010 years, and whose
sphere of interest extended over regions much more than 1010 light years across,
might have very different ideas as to what counts as FAPP impossible.
The concept of something being impossible “for all practical purposes” is relative
to the practical purposes of some particular cognitive agent. So it is, in that sense,
subjective.
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10. Frequentism Revisited
The analysis in Sections 5–8 shows that probability assignments cannot be re-
duced to factual statements about the way things are in the world. Probability
statements and factual statements have a fundamentally different logic.
In particular, the proposition
Q: “The probability of this coin coming up heads is 0.5”
is not, as finite frequentists think, FAPP equivalent to any factual proposition
concerning the number of heads that will occur in a sufficiently long sequence of
tosses.
Furthermore, Q cannot, as falsificationists like Popper think, be FAPP falsified
by any factual proposition concerning the number of heads that will occur in a
sufficiently long sequence of tosses.
The bare fact
F : “The coin came up heads on each of 1000 successive tosses”
is no more reason for thinking that Q is false than the bare fact
F ′: “The coin came up heads on 500 out of 1000 successive tosses”
Of course, if a coin did in reality come up heads on each of 1000 successive tosses,
one would in practice take that as very strong evidence that the coin was biased.
However, this conclusion would be based, not on the bare fact F , but on the dressed
fact P ∧ F , where P is a prior probabilistic assumption.
We have become so habituated to the frequentist way of thinking that this asser-
tion may appear paradoxical. But in fact the point, that F is perfectly consistent
with the coin being fair, is something that is taught in every elementary textbook.
As is well-known, gamblers are prone to believe that if a coin has come up heads
on (say) 2 successive tosses, then the probability of heads on the next toss is < 1/2.
One of the first things students are taught is that this is a fallacy. Provided the
tosses are independent, the probability of heads on the next toss continues to be
1/2, irrespective of how many times heads has come up on the preceding tosses.
This statement is an elementary consequence of the assumption of independence.
It is, of course, true that in practice hardly anyone would continue to believe that a
coin is fair if it kept on coming up heads in toss after toss. But that only shows that,
in practice, hardly anyone would seriously believe that the tosses are independent14.
In practice most people would start out with the belief that the probability of
heads on any given toss ≈ 1/2. But they would also start out with the belief that
if, for example, heads should occur on each of the first n tosses, for some large
number n, then that would mean that the probability of heads on the (n+1)th toss
≈ 1. Symbolically:
P (Er) ≈ 1/2 for all r (24)
and
P (En+1|E1 ∧ · · · ∧ En) ≈ 1 (25)
where Er is the event “heads on the r
th toss”. That pair of propositions is incon-
sistent with the proposition, that successive tosses are independent.
14I should say that there is an ambiguity here, if one looks at it in von Mises’s objectivist
terms. As von Mises sees it, there is a true probability of heads p. If we knew the value of p
the probability of obtaining a sequence s would be given by the conditional distribution P (s|p)
defined by Eq. (4). In that case the probability of heads on the nth toss is independent of what
occurred on the preceding tosses. However, if we do not know the value of p then the probabilities
have to be calculated using the unconditioned distribution P (s) =
∫ 1
0 P (s|p)fi(p)dp. In that case
the tosses are typically not independent —as can be seen from Eq. (29) below.
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The logical basis for these intuitive assumptions is best understood by looking
at the problem in Bayesian terms. From Eq. (5) the prior probability of obtaining,
in the first n tosses, a sequence s containing h(s) heads is
P (s) =
∫ 1
0
ph(s)(1− p)n−h(s)fi(p)dp . (26)
If the prior distribution fi is symmetric about the mid-point p = 1/2
P (Er) =
∫ 1
0
pfi(p)dp = 1/2 for all r (27)
in agreement with Eq. (24). Suppose it is also the case that (for example) fi is
continuous and fi(1) > 0. Then
P (E1 ∧ · · · ∧En) =
∫ 1
0
pnfi(p)dp ≈ fi(1)/(n+ 1) (28)
for suffiently large n. Consequently
P (En+1|E1 ∧ · · · ∧En) ≈
n+ 1
n+ 2
≈ 1 (29)
for sufficiently large n—in agreement with Eq. (25).
However, the value of n at which P (En+1|E1 ∧ · · · ∧En) becomes close to 1 will
depend on the choice of fi. For some choices of fi a comparatively short run of
heads will be enough to convince us that the coin is probably biased. For other
choices a much longer run will be needed. And if fi = δ(p− 0.5) then nothing will
convince us. For that choice of fi
P (En+1|E1 ∧ · · · ∧En) = P (En+1) = 1/2 (30)
for all n. So we would continue to believe that the probability of heads on the
next toss is 1/2 even if (per impossibile) the coin had come up heads on each of the
preceding 10100 tosses.
The distribution fi represents our background assumptions. In other words, it
represents the probabilistic context. The inference is sensitive to that context. For
some contexts P the conjunction P ∧
(∧103
i=1Ei
)
implies that the coin will almost
certainly come up heads on the next toss. For others it implies that the probability
of this happening ≈ 1/2. And if one considers the fact
∧103
i=1Ei in isolation, devoid
of any context, then no conclusion is possible. A bare fact has no (interesting)
probabilistic implications.
It is the contextuality of retrodictive probabilistic inferences which defeats the
frequentist programme.
Finally, let us note that on this account of the matter nothing is falsified. The
proposition P (En+1|E1 ∧ · · · ∧ En) ≈ 1 is built into our starting assumptions. So
if, after E1 ∧ · · · ∧ En has actually occurred, we then believe that En+1 is close to
certain, we are not believing anything that contradicts our starting assumptions.
11. Probability is Epistemic
Before the outcome is known we consider that Alice is most unlikely to win the
lottery. But then she does win. We do not conclude that we were wrong. Instead,
we conclude that Alice was very lucky. So what, exactly, is meant by saying that
Alice is most unlikely to win the lottery?
The frequentist strategy, of replacing a single lottery draw with a long sequence
of draws, does nothing to answer that question. All it achieves is to replace the
statement, that something is very unlikely, with the statement, that something else
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is even more unlikely. It does not take us any nearer to understanding what it
actually means to say that something is very unlikely.
Nevertheless, probability assignments are clearly not devoid of content. To see
what their content is, consider the proposition “Alice was very lucky to win the
lottery” asserted after it is known that she did in fact win the lottery. This means
something like: though Alice did win the lottery, she could not reasonably have
expected to win. The proposition is not unrelated to empirical facts about the
lottery. But the primary focus is on Alice, and her subjective attitude.
Suppose Alice confidently asserts “I am going to win the lottery”, before the
result is known. If she then wins the lottery, we have to agree that her statement
was factually correct. But we do not have to agree that her confidence was justified.
And that is the important sense in which one can meaningfully describe something
as very unlikely, even though it has actually happened.
Compare:
Case 1: Alice neglects to make any pension contributions on the
grounds that, when the time comes, she can always buy a lottery
ticket. When she reaches the age of 65 she buys one lottery ticket,
the ticket wins, and she enjoys a comfortable retirement.
Case 2: Bob neglects to make any pension contributions on the
grounds that he has £10,000,000 invested in several large companies
listed on the Stock Exchange. Shortly before he retires all the
companies go bankrupt. He lives out his remaining years in penury.
Even though it is Alice’s expectations that are actually fulfilled, we would still
(most of us) consider that Bob’s expectations were more reasonable.
The statement, that Alice’s behaviour is unreasonable, expresses some kind of
value judgment. De Finetti would doubtless object to the word “unreasonable”.
He would prefer to describe Alice’s behaviour as “crazy” (de Finetti [30], p. 175).
However, he would still be expressing a negative evaluation.
In this paper I have been making the negative point: that probability state-
ments do not reduce to purely factual statements, concerning events out there in
the world. I remain very uncertain regarding the positive question, as to how
probability statements should be interpreted.
However, although I have no definite opinion about many of the details, I feel that
in general terms Maxwell must be right when he says that the theory of probability
has an essentially normative significance. We use it to evaluate alternative beliefs
and proposed courses of action: to decide what, in given circumstances, it is best
or most appropriate to think and do.
12. Reality: Einsteinian or Bohrian?
For a long time Einstein strongly objected to the indeterminism of quantum
mechanics. As he put it in a letter to Born [65] (p. 91), written in 1926:
Quantum mechanics is certainly imposing. But an inner voice tells
me that it is not yet the real thing. The theory says a lot, but does
not really bring us any closer to the secret of the ‘old one’. I, at
any rate, am convinced that He is not playing at dice.
He expressed the same view in another letter (ibid p. 149) written as late as 1944.
I think people often find it difficult to understand why Einstein was so emphatic in
his rejection of a dice-playing God. Quantum mechanics presents many obstacles
to the understanding. But the concept of an objective chance seems intuitively
very natural. The commonsense world is full of entities endowed with propensities
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of one kind or another. At least as judged by the standards of commonsense, if
anything is paradoxical, it is the rigid determinism of classical physics.
Einstein apparently came to feel this himself in the end. In 1954 Pauli [65]
(p. 221) reports him as “disput[ing] that he uses as criterion for the admissibility
of a theory the question: ‘Is it rigorously deterministic?’ ”. However, it seems
to me that Einstein gave in too easily. There are very strong objections to the
dice-playing aspect of quantum mechanics, if one approaches it from Einstein’s
philosophical standpoint.
The commonsense world is indeed full of real chances. But it is also full of other
things, such as real colour qualia. It has been accepted since the 17th century
that colour qualia are not in fact physically real at all. According to Newton [66]
(p. 124–5):
“. . . the Rays to speak properly are not coloured. In them there
is nothing else than a certain Power and Disposition to stir up a
Sensation of this or that Colour”
and
“. . . Colours in the Object are nothing but a Disposition to reflect
this or that sort of Rays more copiously than the rest; in the Rays
they are nothing but their Dispositions to propagate this or that
Motion into the Sensorium, and in the Sensorium they are Sensa-
tions of those Motions under the Forms of Colours”
In short: colour qualia are mental, not physical.
Interestingly Newton makes no attempt to justify this assertion, either on exper-
imental, or on any other grounds. Instead he proposes it as a definition: something
we should just accept. However, I think it is worth asking why.
The obvious answer to this question is that real qualia would not fit in with the
kind of mechanical picture which Newton is trying to construct. However, I want
to focus on a different point: namely, that perceived colour qualia clearly depend
on physiological peculiarities of the human eye-brain system. For instance, there
are conventionally said to be 7 colours in the visible spectrum. The number 7 is,
perhaps, a little arbitrary. But I believe no one experiences, say, 106 distinct qualia.
The explanation for this must presumably lie with properties of the human eye and
brain—not with properties of the electromagnetic spectrum.
It follows that, if one were to construct a theory in which the qualia were repre-
sented as physically real, then one would be building into one’s picture of physical
reality features which actually derive from ourselves.
Newton’s standpoint, and Einstein’s standpoint in his later years, was that the
aim of physics is to construct a a picture of things as they are intrinsically, in
themselves, without any trace of subjective contamination. From that point of
view the concept of a real colour qualium is unacceptable.
If that is your point of view, then the concept of a real probability, or propensity,
must be equally unacceptable. According to the analysis in the preceding sections a
probability statement is a statement about what, in given circumstances, one may
reasonably think or do. This reference to our own cognitive processes means that
the concept can have no place in the purely objective world-view which Einstein
was trying to construct.
In short, it seems to me that Einstein, given his conceptual standpoint, had
every reason to reject the notion of a dice-playing God. If one chooses to follow
the Einsteinian road then one had better look for a fully causal interpretation of
quantum mechanics, such as the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation.
However, there is another possibility. One could, instead, choose to go down
what might be called the Bohrian road. Nothing with quantum mechanics built
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into it could be called commonsensical. But a Bohrian view of the world would be
like commonsense in as much as it would make essential reference to the cognitive
agent, whose view it is. It would be colour-full and value-laden.
As it stands now the Bohrian view is, to my mind, very obscure. But it may
have within it the potential for fruitful development.
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